Writers Guild of America West (WGAW) and American Federation of Musicians (AFM) are pleased to submit the following comment to the Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (“the Agencies”) regarding the Draft Merger Guidelines (“Draft Guidelines”) issued on July 19, 2023. The WGAW is a labor union representing over 11,000 writers in the television, film, news, and streaming video industries. AFM is the largest organization in the world representing 70,000 professional musicians playing in orchestras, bands, clubs, and theater—both on Broadway and on tour. AFM members make music for film, television, commercials, and sound recordings.

WGAW and AFM strongly support the Draft Guidelines, which make critical changes to the merger review process to promote effective antitrust enforcement and prevent harmful mergers. WGAW and AFM’s comment will focus on the Draft Guidelines’ inclusion of labor markets in merger review and offer some suggestions to strengthen worker protections.

The Draft Guidelines Meaningfully Incorporate Labor Market Harms in Merger Review

The Draft Guidelines take an important step forward by explicitly including labor markets in merger review. The impact of mergers and other anticompetitive behavior on workers has long been ignored in antitrust enforcement, to disastrous effect. In media, decades of mergers and vertical integration have harmed writers and musicians and have given employers tremendous market power which they have used to decrease workers’ pay, worsen working conditions, and capture an increasing share of the value of writers’ and musicians’ work.

Many of the issues that led to the current nationwide strike of 11,500 screen and television writers, which began on May 2, 2023, reflect the types of labor market harms detailed in the Draft Guidelines. In the past few years, writers have seen their inflation-adjusted pay decline despite growth in industry profits.¹ Writers have been increasingly pushed into shorter-term, precarious employment, and in streaming video, employers have used their power to impose new compensation models that cut out all other industry participants—including writers and independent producers—from sharing in the benefit of the industry’s growth. Many of these changes are departures from compensation models that had been industry standards for decades. The entertainment industry’s major employers—including Disney, Comcast-NBCUniversal, Paramount Global, Warner Bros. Discovery, Netflix, Amazon, and Apple—refused to meaningfully negotiate these and other key issues, leading the members of WGAW and Writers Guild of America East (jointly, “WGA”) to authorize a strike that has continued for more than four months.

WGAW and AFM are encouraged that numerous elements of the Draft Guidelines support greater scrutiny of mergers on the basis of their harms to workers, including but not limited to:
The Draft Guidelines move away from the consumer welfare standard and a deference to so-called “efficiencies,” including a commitment not to “credit vague or speculative claims” or “benefits outside the relevant market.” Numerous mergers in media have been approved on the speculative basis that they would bring efficiencies that would lower prices for consumers despite their likelihood of causing harm, including in labor markets. In just one example, the AT&T-Time Warner merger purported to result in “considerable efficiencies,” and innovation via elimination of double marginalization that would benefit consumers. Not only did these consumer benefits fail to materialize, the merger caused significant harm in other markets, including thousands of worker layoffs and underpayment of key talent on Time Warner films.

The Draft Guidelines rightfully acknowledge that mergers may be anticompetitive at lower Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) levels in labor markets than consumer markets. As WGAW has written to the FTC before, numerous characteristics of the labor market for writers in the professional entertainment industry increase employer market power beyond what a pure market share or HHI assessment would suggest. Writers are free agents in markets where finding work is notoriously difficult, with irregular demand, narrow job availability by genre and writer title, and an outsized role for idiosyncratic preferences in matching talent with employers. Information asymmetries and vertical integration between content producers and distributors further increase the market power of employers. And as the Draft Guidelines correctly note, mergers themselves can lower demand for workers, further complicating the use of market share to assess levels of competition. For example, Disney’s series of horizontal mergers (Marvel Entertainment in 2009 and Lucasfilm in 2012) allowed the company to reduce its employment of writers by 32% from 2009 through 2016.

The Draft Guidelines call for the Agencies to evaluate whether mergers will increase the risk of coordination or entrench a firm in a dominant position. There is evidence that labor markets for writing and musical services are vulnerable to tacit coordination from the few powerful employers, with terms that favor employers over writers and musicians—many at issue in the current WGA strike—spreading among employers to become “standard.” For instance, low ceilings on experienced writer pay and severe underpayment for work during series post-production are both practices that depart from historical practice in the industry and appear to have spread from Netflix to other major employers, illustrating both Netflix’s market hegemony and the ease of tacit coordination among major employers.

The Draft Guidelines establish greater scrutiny of vertical integration. The media and entertainment sector is heavily characterized by vertical integration and aptly illustrates the attendant harms. The industry’s major employers are all vertically integrated conglomerates, combining content production and distribution arms, and increasingly focused on distributing their own content. This forecloses competition from independent producers and distributors, and leads to wage suppression for writers, musicians, and other industry workers.
In these and other ways, the Draft Guidelines represent significant progress and should facilitate better enforcement against harmful mergers and anticompetitive actions in media and entertainment along with other industries.

The Guidelines Should be Strengthened

While the Draft Guidelines substantially further antitrust enforcement and address some worker concerns, the Agencies should take additional steps to strengthen them.

**Lower Structural Presumptions**

The Agencies should consider lower levels for the Guidelines’ structural presumptions. The Draft Guidelines focus their proposed structural presumption on post-merger HHI over 1,800 or market share over 30% along with an HHI increase greater than 100. While this is an improvement over the current structural presumption threshold, anticompetitive market power can exist—and mergers should be viewed skeptically—at lower thresholds. For instance, a merger between Comcast-NBCUniversal and Warner Bros. Discovery would leave the combined company with less than 30% of domestic subscription streaming revenue, but would still significantly reduce consumer choice and worker leverage.

**Unions and Labor Market Harms**

We commend the Agencies’ inclusion of labor organizations as sources of data during merger review. The Draft Guidelines should go further in recognizing a given merger’s impact on collective bargaining when examining harms to labor markets, particularly when workers at both merging firms are under the same or similar collective bargaining agreements. A merger of employers typically enhances employer leverage in collective bargaining because the employers no longer compete against one another to obtain a labor contract and avert a work stoppage.

Even when multiple employers negotiate together with a single labor union, as they do in the entertainment industry, a merger can increase the employers’ relative bargaining power. A small number of major employers have an increased ability to coordinate and agree in bargaining to resist union demands. Between negotiating cycles, these employers face less competition for workers’ labor, which increases their ability to resist improvements in wages and working conditions. During the past decade, entertainment industry employers—their bargaining power enhanced through rounds of consolidation—have significantly depressed writers’ “overscale” compensation—that portion of compensation in excess of union minimums, which is negotiated individually by agents. Experienced writers have traditionally earned multiples of the union minimum, but powerful employers have been able to demand that even these most experienced writers work at or near the same minimum pay as writers who are just starting out. As a consequence, the WGA has been forced to negotiate—and now to strike over—elements of writer pay that had previously been left to individual overscale negotiations.

The growing consolidation of media companies, and the vertical integration of content producers and distributors, has also led to disputes among the bargaining parties in the period between contract negotiations. For example, WGAW filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board against Amazon for withholding the number of Amazon Prime video subscribers in an effort to underpay writers whose residuals payments were tied to subscriber tiers. WGAW also filed arbitration claims against Paramount and Netflix for
undervaluing “imputed” license fees to vertically-integrated streaming services. Each of these disputes stems directly from the increasing consolidation of the media companies and should be considered evidence of employer market power.

Beyond Future Merger Transactions

Stronger guidelines are necessary to guard against future harmful mergers. But even the existing level of consolidation and vertical integration in the media industry is unacceptable and demands regulatory oversight. We urge the Agencies to investigate consummated mergers and anticompetitive conduct using the frameworks laid out in the Draft Guidelines.

For more information regarding the harmful impacts of past media mergers and vertical integration in the media industry, please see the following WGAW reports, included as appendices to this comment:

- The New Gatekeepers: How Disney, Amazon and Netflix will take over Media (August 2023)
- How the Warner Bros. Discovery Merger Hurts Workers and Diversity (January 2023)

Conclusion: The Agencies Should Enforce these Principles Aggressively

The Draft Guidelines are a clear improvement to the current guidelines and, if implemented, will establish fundamental protections for both workers and consumers. Numerous harmful media industry mergers might have been blocked, and their harms prevented, had these Draft Guidelines been in place at the time of merger review. The updated guidelines are urgently needed, as Wall Street continues to demand more consolidation in the media industry. As WGAW’s The New Gatekeepers report discusses, Disney, Amazon, and Netflix are prime candidates for future consolidation, and each has demonstrated that it will abuse its position of dominance—with workers, consumers, and competitors—when given the opportunity. Just in the past year, analysts have speculated that Apple will buy Disney15 and Comcast-NBCUniversal will buy Warner Bros. Discovery.16 Any of these mergers would be extremely harmful and would result in additional rounds of reactive consolidation, as the few remaining companies seek to scale up in response.

It is critical that the Agencies consider how any future proposed mergers in this industry would impact writers, musicians, and other industry workers. These Draft Guidelines are an important step in strengthening enforcement to foster a vibrant, competitive environment for workers and audiences of the content that writers and musicians create.

Respectfully submitted,

/Meredith Stiehm/
Meredith Stiehm
President
Writers Guild of America West

/Tino Gagliardi/
Tino Gagliardi
International President
American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada
September 18, 2023


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2 U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Merger Guidelines, Section IV.3
5 Id. at 183.
9 “[L]oss of competition through a merger of two firms may lead the merged firm to...lay off or stop hiring workers.” U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Merger Guidelines, Appendix 2.D.
11 MoffettNathanson, 2Q 2023 SVOD Subscriber estimates.
The New Gatekeepers
How Disney, Amazon, and Netflix Will Take Over Media
August 2023
Executive Summary

The rise of streaming video over the past decade provided some amount of increased competition and a greater diversity of content than ever before. However, deregulation and mergers have laid the groundwork for a future of increased market power that could soon leave just three companies controlling what content is made, what consumers can watch, and how they can watch it. Disney, Amazon, and Netflix are positioning themselves to be the new gatekeepers of media, growing through acquisitions and using their increased power to disadvantage competitors, raise prices for consumers, and to push down wages for creative workers. Pay and working conditions for writers have become so dire, and media conglomerates so unresponsive, that 11,500 writers went on strike in May 2023. Without intervention, these conglomerates will seize control of the media landscape and the streaming era’s advances for creativity and choice will be lost.

These new gatekeepers have amassed market power through mergers and other anti-competitive practices, offering an alarming window into the future of media.

- **Disney** has grown through a series of multibillion-dollar acquisitions, using its power to reduce film output, shut down competing studios, foreclose independent content from its distribution networks, expand control of the labor market, and force creators to give up financial participation in future licensing revenue.

- **Amazon** has gained a sizeable footprint in media in a short time by utilizing the well-documented playbook critical to its ascendance as a tech company. Though anticompetitive behavior and vertical integration, Amazon has harmed competitors, privileged its related business, and abused employer leverage to underpay writers.

- **Netflix** was once an innovative competitor, but is now using its position as the largest streaming service in the world to abuse its leverage as an employer, decrease innovative content spending and raise prices for consumers. The company has cut out independent producers and severely underpaid writers in multiple areas, and a series of recent acquisitions signal its intent to further increase dominance and market power in order to reduce innovative content investment.

Streaming video is now the dominant distribution platform for content, but it is largely unregulated, taking the problems of vertical integration and media consolidation to the extreme. Streaming’s dominant employers have used their leverage to erode the sustainability of writing work; further consolidation could result in fewer writers able to earn a living and diminished variety in the marketplace of ideas. It is crucial that antitrust agencies and lawmakers take the following actions to protect the future of media:

1. Block further consolidation;
2. Proactively investigate anti-competitive issues and outcomes; and
3. Increase regulation and oversight in streaming.
Introduction

In 1970, three broadcast networks controlled American television programming. ABC, CBS, and NBC had used their control over the distribution chain of television networks and stations to “restrain and monopolize” prime time entertainment, and viewers could only watch what these three entities deemed worthwhile. In response, federal agencies acted to break up the monopoly with the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules (Fin-Syn), sharply limiting the networks’ ability to produce or control the content for their own networks. This antitrust action produced the 1970s “golden era” of television that challenged social and political narratives of the time—the result of a dynamic market of independent producers competing to hire writers, and the three networks competing for ideas.

Since then, a succession of new technologies—cable television, home video, and streaming—has altered the landscape for video programming, with the “increased competition” used to justify deregulation. The rise of online video spurred the creation of more content, more streaming services, and greater diversity of choice than ever before. But within a few short years, professional video programming is likely to once again be monopolized. Disney, Amazon, and Netflix are perfectly positioned to become the new gatekeepers of media, and are being urged by Wall Street to do so.

Rather than compete, Disney, Amazon, and Netflix—like other Big Tech companies Apple, Facebook, and Google—have increased market share and leverage through acquisitions, wielding their control of related markets, and underpricing their services to achieve dominance. Each is now taking anti-competitive vertical integration to an extreme, turning its streaming service into a walled garden for self-produced content—a model built for and dependent on restricting the availability of independent content from competing producers, underpaying creators, and, above all, making future consolidation the name of the industry game.

Spurred on by a blatant Wall Street demand for consolidation, Disney, Amazon, and Netflix are prime candidates for future mergers. Each has demonstrated that it will abuse a position of dominance to disadvantage competing producers and streaming services, reduce output, creativity, and choice in content, and push down wages for creative workers. Unless antitrust agencies and lawmakers prevent future merger activity by dominant firms and step in to preserve and protect the competitive environment for other streaming services, the future of content is in peril.

Disney: Gatekeeper of Content Production

The Walt Disney Company is the most powerful legacy media conglomerate, growing through acquisition after acquisition to establish unparalleled labor market power and a gatekeeper position in streaming. In 1995, Disney became a vertically integrated film and television studio through its $19 billion acquisition of the ABC broadcast network—taking advantage of the repeal of the Fin-Syn rules two years before, which had discouraged vertical control in television distribution. The company then proceeded to swallow four competing film and television studios between 2006 and 2019: Pixar ($7.4 billion), Marvel Entertainment ($4 billion), Lucasfilm ($4 billion), and Twentieth Century Fox ($71.3 billion), along with acquiring a majority share in Hulu. With each merger, Disney gained market share and leverage against its competitors and its workers, becoming the second-largest distributor of television and online series, the largest employer of television and digital writers, and the second-largest employer of theatrical writers after Netflix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Acquisition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>ABC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Pixar</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Marvel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Lucasfilm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>21st Century Fox</td>
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Disney’s growing power in an increasingly concentrated market has produced a host of anti-competitive behavior.

- **Reduced output and innovation:** Acquisitions of competing film studios facilitated a sharp decline in Disney’s film output—65% between 2009 and 2017—and its employment of writers, with tentpole features reducing the need for innovative research and development while Disney still dominated US box office. Shortly after buying Fox, Disney also shuttered Fox’s Blue Sky Studios animation company—a competitor with Disney’s own in-house animation studios.

- **Increased vertical integration in streaming:** Following the Fox acquisition, Disney led a trend in aggressively withdrawing library content from other distributors like Netflix in order to funnel its content to flagship streaming service Disney+, with other studios like Time Warner and NBC Universal following Disney’s lead. Moreover, Disney’s streaming services are now almost exclusively homes for Disney-produced original content, foreclosing these two major streaming services as potential markets for independent producers. In the 2021-2022 season, every original scripted series made for Disney+ was self-produced, along with the vast majority of series on Hulu. This vertical integration will have profound implications for the content production market and for the writers who must sell content to Disney’s studios in order to get their work onto Disney’s platforms. Industry analyst firm MoffettNathanson anticipates Disney’s dominance, projecting that Disney will represent 42% of all domestic streaming subscribers and 49% of domestic streaming revenue by 2025.

- **Increased Prices:** Disney has very quickly become a dominant player in streaming; in August 2022, the company’s total streaming subscriberhip surpassed Netflix’s. In a preview of the future,...
this milestone was followed by an announcement of a 14% to 43% price increase across Disney’s streaming services, with more yet to come. The company does not expect to lose many customers despite the fee hikes, reflecting the market power it has already established.

**Power over creative workers:** Shortly after merging with Fox, Disney unilaterally pressured creators and other entertainment workers to forgo their participation in future licensing revenue on Disney shows, a decades-long industry practice for the creative forces behind Disney’s valuable content. Disney’s size and power, along with its vertical integration, allowed the company to cut pay without losing talent, as writers negotiating against a massive combined producer-distributor cannot walk away from the distributor’s poor terms without also leaving the show they created. Disney’s labor market dominance is compounded by the powerful intellectual property it has acquired; for instance, writers who want to work on *Star Wars, Indiana Jones,* or most Marvel projects (including *Black Panther, Iron Man, Captain America, Daredevil,* and *X-Men*) have no choice but to work for Disney.

Disney has plainly demonstrated the strategies it will pursue to gain market power, and the harm that will result from its exercise of that power. In ongoing pursuit of its gatekeeper dominance in streaming, Disney could seek to buy another competing studio or increase its labor market power by acquiring still more valuable intellectual property. The company is poised to control half of the domestic streaming market even before potential acquisitions, with a corresponding level of control over what content gets made and what stories writers can sell to earn a living.

**Amazon: Gatekeeper of Content Distribution**

Though Amazon is a newer entrant, in a short period of time it has gained a sizeable footprint in multiple media businesses. Amazon has utilized the well-documented playbook of anti-competitive business practices that have been critical to its ascendance as a tech company to also become the third-largest video subscription service in the U.S. and a leading gatekeeper in the entertainment industry. Exploitative practices Amazon has employed include predatory pricing, aggressive acquisitions, and establishing, then abusing, its position between competitors and consumers.

**Integration and acquisition:** Amazon entered the media industry with its Prime Video streaming service in 2006 and followed with its ad-supported streaming service Freevee in 2019. Prime Video is available at no additional cost to a majority of Amazon’s 200 million global Prime shipping subscribers, competing less through quality investments and innovation than through leveraging Amazon’s size and power in other markets such as e-commerce. The company followed its initial entry with aggressive moves into adjacent businesses. Amazon Studios was founded in 2010 to produce content for the service, and the company introduced Amazon Fire TVs and Fire TV Sticks in 2014 followed by the Amazon Channels store in 2015, positioning Amazon as an intermediary between competing content providers and consumers.
third-party streaming services and viewers who access content through Amazon devices and its service. Like Disney, Amazon’s streaming business forecloses independent competitors in production and distribution. Amazon Studios has never produced a show for an unaffiliated service or network, and during the 2021-2022 season, 86% of online scripted content on Amazon platforms was self-supplied. Most recently, Amazon acquired the historic Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) Studios and its valuable library of intellectual property in 2022 to bolster its relatively anemic content catalog. This array of interconnected media businesses reaches the entire content value chain, giving the company both the ability and incentive to disadvantage third-party competitors in each market—from content production (Amazon Studios, MGM), to content distribution (Prime Video, Freevee, MGM+), to streaming aggregation/devices (Amazon Channels and Fire TV).

**Amazon Media Expansion**

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<tr>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2022 ($8.5 bn.)</th>
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Sources: CNET, TechCrunch, Business Insider, Variety

**Extracting tolls from competitors:** Amazon has been aggressive in using its gatekeeper position to extract tolls from competitors, just as it does in e-commerce with sellers. The company has leveraged its control of viewers with Fire devices to make burdensome demands of third-party streaming services. In exchange for making third-party streaming services available via the Fire interface, Amazon has reportedly demanded that those streaming services license content to Amazon-owned Freevee, provide Amazon shares of their services’
advertising inventory, and give Amazon 15% to 45% of their monthly revenues.\textsuperscript{25} The company has also tried to keep content from unaffiliated streamers like HBO Max within Amazon Channels, where Amazon sells access to other streaming services and demands 30% to 50% of third-party services' monthly revenues.\textsuperscript{26} As a gatekeeper, Amazon hosts an unlevel playing field where it can privilege its own services in user interfaces or potentially harvest valuable viewership data of competitors to inform its own content decisions and advertising strategies.

\textbf{Abusing dominance to harm competitors and benefit related businesses:} For several months after the launch of HBO Max in 2020, customers were unable to gain access to the service through Amazon devices. The dispute reportedly stemmed from HBO executives' attempts to retain control of their streaming service over Amazon's demand to keep HBO Max on Amazon Channels, where Amazon would control the user experience and access to viewership data.\textsuperscript{27} News commentary suggested that the lack of availability on Amazon Fire devices notably slowed subscriber growth for HBO Max,\textsuperscript{28} and when a deal was finally reached months later, the terms reportedly included an extension of WarnerMedia's contract with Amazon Web Services.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{Abusing employer leverage:} Amazon claimed that Prime Video had fewer than 45 million domestic subscribers for years—even after analysts estimated it had crossed that threshold—\textsuperscript{30} in order to underpay the higher residuals that would be due to writers if the service had more than 45 million subscribers. Only after the Writers Guild of America West (WGAW) filed an Unfair Labor Practice charge against the company with the National Labor Relations Board demanding subscriber information did Amazon finally concede to pay higher residuals based on higher subscriber numbers beginning in July 2021.

Having extended its reach into every corner of media, Amazon has shown the role it seeks to play. It will use its gatekeeper position to determine what services consumers can access on its TVs and devices, and to extract fees from all sides. Amazon's purchase of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios—its second-largest ever acquisition—shows that the company's intent is to bring its platform monopoly playbook to dominate media.

\section*{Netflix: Gatekeeper in Employment}

Netflix offers another alarming preview of the future in media. Originally the upstart competitor, innovating and prompting competitive responses from the traditional studios, Netflix has become a powerful incumbent focused on raising prices, vertically integrating, and exerting its dominance over workers.

Netflix pioneered the distribution of movies and television series via online streaming, providing consumers with an alternative to costly cable packages. Though it initially offered licensed movies and series from other studios, Netflix ventured into exclusive original programming in 2011, enlivening competition with traditional networks, buying content from third parties, and increasing employment opportunities for writers. Early investments included premium television series developed in partnership with mid-sized producers such as \textit{House of Cards}, produced...
by Media Rights Capital, increasing the market for independent content. In contrast to its competitors, Netflix experimented with production and distribution models by ordering shows straight-to-series and releasing all episodes of a season simultaneously. Netflix also displayed a willingness to give creators significant latitude, to cater to niche audiences with shows like the original comedy Grace and Frankie, and to revive cancelled series such as the cult-classic Arrested Development after its cancellation by Fox.

Now the largest streaming service in the world with over 220 million paid subscribers, Netflix is no longer a pro-competitive player. The company is pursuing a strategy of pure vertical integration and strategic acquisitions, abusing its leverage as an employer, decreasing innovative content spending, and raising prices for consumers.

**Integration and acquisitions:** When it embarked on original programming, Netflix bought original content from a healthy market of independent content producers, with almost all of its original series that season produced by third parties. But the company has steadily increased its share of self-produced content; in the 2021-2022 season Netflix had a 29% share of original online scripted series and 61% of those series were self-produced. Like Amazon, Netflix has never produced a series for another distributor. By pursuing this strategy of vertical integration, Netflix seeks to decrease the price it pays for content—as it stated to investors, producing content in-house “avoid[s] the markup 3rd party studios charge us” and cuts out the “studio middleman.” This behavior eliminates earnings for independent producers and the writers who create for them, and increases Netflix’s control of the production market. Signaling its intent to increase its dominance and market power, Netflix has now acquired multiple companies in related sectors: film production studio Albuquerque Studios ($30 million), animation studios Scanline VFX and Animal Logic, intellectual property catalogs Millarworld ($30 million) and The Roald Dahl Story Company ($686 million), as well as video game studios Night School Studio, Next Games ($72 million), and Boss Fight.

**Abusing employer leverage:** Netflix has rapidly grown in market share as an employer, rising from being a new entrant to the largest employer of screenwriters and the largest employer of writers for online series (followed by Disney) within just seven years. With increasing leverage over workers, the company has reportedly set a low ceiling on experienced writers’ pay, and has attempted to severely underpay writers for their work during series’ post-production. Netflix’s power is such that it can impose these subpar terms of employment on even the most powerful writer with responsibility for running a given show. Both of these practices appear to be spreading to other major employers, illustrating the ease of tacit coordination among the handful of powerful buyers in the writing labor market. This behavior parallels the “industry-wide standardization of
certain contract terms...in ways that favor publishers over authors” that featured significantly in the U.S. District Court’s decision to block the acquisition of Simon & Schuster by Penguin Random House. Finally, Netflix systematically “negotiated” artificially low license fees with itself on more than one hundred original theatrical projects in order to underpay the screenwriters who were due a royalty-like shares of the fees called “residuals.” Following a lengthy challenge from the WGAW, Netflix agreed to pay out approximately $42 million in unpaid residual compensation to several hundred writers on those projects.

Control over creative labor: If a show produced for Netflix is cancelled—sometimes despite apparent popularity—it is virtually impossible for writers to take the show to other platforms. Thus far, no show wholly produced by Netflix has moved to another service. Only a few shows that are produced by other studios, like *Tuca & Bertie* and *One Day at a Time*, have had the option of moving to another channel or service. Netflix also popularized the now-standard practice among streaming services of releasing limited, if any, viewership information, decreasing writers’ and other talents’ leverage in employment negotiations by denying them crucial information about the success of their own work.

Reduced investment in content: Netflix’s subscriber growth has recently begun to slow; in response, the company is seeking to cut costs on content. Wall Street firms have praised Netflix’s transition away from competitive content investment, celebrating its ability to execute layoffs and reduce spending, especially in “niche programming” and “content exploration.”

Increased subscription fees: Netflix is facing increasing demands from Wall Street to raise subscription rates. Netflix has already raised the price of all three U.S. tier subscriptions by 11% in the past two years, and more than 25% on its premium subscription in the past three years. Industry analysts have noted that Netflix’s ability to raise prices and maintain low subscriber churn is illustrative of its pricing power. As one analyst speculated, “[T]hough initial acceleration to the platform was driven by original content, the new wave of acceleration will likely be driven by pricing.”

Netflix’s recent actions offer a preview of its future as a content gatekeeper. No longer committed to competitive innovation, the company will slash programming and underpay workers, abusing its dominant position to offer consumers less content—and less innovative content—for more money.
The Future of Media

Without Intervention, the Gatekeepers Will Seize Control

Disney, Amazon, and Netflix are positioning themselves as the key gatekeepers of media and its vital marketplace of ideas: the dominant firms who decide what content gets made, what consumers can watch, and how they can watch it. The path to this future will be charted by snowballing consolidation; less creativity, choice, and innovation in content; increased downward pressure on writer pay; and higher prices for consumers. Vertical integration means that players in the entertainment market must have both production and streaming distribution arms to remain competitive, a significant hurdle for new entrants, smaller competitors, and independent producers. Meanwhile, each round of consolidation will cause still more reactive consolidation. Some streamers will exit the market or be bought by others. Paramount, Sony, and Warner Bros. Discovery are not likely to remain competitors in scripted online video for much longer, with Wall Street analysts predicting these companies will be candidates for consolidation. Paramount is disadvantaged by a comparative lack of scale, Sony by a lack of vertical integration, and Warner Bros. Discovery appears to be already withdrawing from its investment in HBO Max.
Wall Street, with its rapacious demand for profits, is unenthusiastic about even the current level of competition in streaming video, and insists on further consolidation in order to lower spending on content and enable higher prices. Wall Street analyst Michael Nathanson argued recently that “This has to become a less competitive industry...they need to consolidate,”49 while another analyst recommends that Disney sell Hulu and buy Netflix.50 If a few competitors drop out of the streaming business, the few services remaining will be able to reduce content spending and increase subscription prices without a commensurate loss of customers. Recent price hikes at Netflix, Disney+, and Hulu are only the beginning; Wall Street is pushing media towards an environment of comfortable collusion among a small number of mega-firms.

Meanwhile, the labor market for writing is already squeezed by employer abuse that grows worse with the increasing power of media gatekeepers. In recent years, employer abuses including shorter and more precarious employment for lower-level writers and caps on experienced writer pay have spread through the industry to become “standard,” threatening writers’ ability to sustain careers. The accumulation of market power enables these companies to undervalue writing services and the writers who supply them. Further consolidation will leave writers with only a few potential employers, and these dominant content buyers will have a significantly decreased incentive to innovate. Writers will see even more downward pressure on their wages, and fewer will be able to make a living from their writing, in turn reducing output, creativity, and diversity of content.

Action is Required to Protect Competition

When the Fin-Syn rules were abandoned, deregulation was justified based on the growth of basic cable, which purported to offer more competition for broadcast networks. However, this deregulation was almost immediately followed by more consolidation, with production entities, broadcast networks, and cable networks combining into a handful of media conglomerates. A few related regulations, such as Program Access and Dual Network rules,51 remain in place in an effort to counter the anti-competitive incentives of vertical integration and the importance of a multiplicity of voices in media, respectively.

But the past few years have seen streaming video replace cable and broadcast as the dominant distribution platform for content, taking the problems of vertical integration and media consolidation to the extreme without any regulation at all. For instance, while the Dual Network rule prohibits Disney from owning two of the four major broadcast networks and have thus prevented Disney from buying the Fox broadcast network, no such rule precludes Disney from owning Disney+ and Hulu—two of the four largest streaming services in the U.S.—or from combining them into a single entity, as the company has suggested it may do in the coming years.52 The Federal Communication Commission regularly investigates the state of competition in broadcast and cable along with key public interest issues like diversity in media ownership, but no regulatory body is currently overseeing such questions—or creating Fin-Syn-like protections—in streaming video. Recent moves from the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to aggressively target harmful mergers and unfair methods of competition are a promising shift after years of inaction, but more action is needed.

Media’s history is rife with attempts at monopolization. When regulators and enforcers in the 1970s saw an environment similar to today’s, with three powerful companies controlling content, they stepped in. The Federal Communications Commission and the Department of Justice, through regulation and antitrust enforcement, crafted
the Fin-Syn rules, ushering in a “golden age” of independent production. The current environment calls for similarly bold, sweeping action.

**Recommendations**

Antitrust agencies and lawmakers must pursue multiple paths of action to address the accumulation of gatekeeper power and its threat to the future of media:

1. Block further consolidation. Disney, Amazon, and Netflix have all demonstrated that they view acquisitions as a key strategy for gaining market power, and Wall Street actively demands consolidation in this market to increase profits. These three gatekeepers are likely candidates for future merger activity which would increase their control over what content is made, how consumers can access it, and how creators are compensated for it. Any mergers in media and entertainment involving significant streaming players should be blocked, including acquisitions of smaller or potential competitors.

2. Proactively investigate anti-competitive issues and outcomes. As detailed above and in the WGAW’s *Broken Promises* report, rounds of anti-competitive mergers and the growing power of key gatekeepers are pushing media towards extreme vertical integration and a future of tight control by just a few firms. Antitrust agencies should thoroughly investigate the state of competition in this industry, including merger outcomes that have reduced competition, how vertical integration is increasing the power of these gatekeeper firms, and the monopsony power of media employers.

3. Increase regulation and oversight in streaming. The media and entertainment industry plays a key role in U.S. society and culture, where the free exchange of ideas and diversity of content support the broader public interest. As content has moved from regulated markets of broadcast and cable to the unregulated venue of streaming, the government oversight that is crucial to maintaining effective and healthy competition—particularly in an industry that tends toward consolidation—has failed to keep up. Whether through agency rulemaking or legislation, new rules against anti-competitive self-preferencing behavior or rules requiring a certain level of independent content on streaming services are necessary to level the playing field.
Endnotes


[4] Internal WGAW earnings data; WGAW analysis.


[7] WGAW analysis; Disney dominated the box office with the largest share of in-year gross revenue each year between 2016 and 2021 with the exception of 2020, which was heavily impacted by COVID-19.


[10] WGAW analysis. On Hulu, 85% of series were produced or co-produced by Disney, with another 4% produced by Hulu’s minority owner NBC Universal.


[23] WGAW analysis.


[35] WGAW analysis.


[38] Internal WGAW earnings data; WGAW analysis.


Program Access rules require vertically integrated cable companies to make cable channels they own available to competing cable companies; the Dual Network rules effectively prevent a single company from owning any of two of the four major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC).


“Nothing good has ever happened to either consumers or labor when massive companies consolidate.”
— Mike Schur, creator of Parks and Recreation and The Good Place

On April 8, 2022, the Discovery WarnerMedia transaction closed, creating a new entity that, according to the company’s press release, “will be able to invest in more original content,” and “create more opportunity for underrepresented storytellers and independent creators.” But less than a year later, the company has instead cancelled, pulled, or written off $2 billion in content and laid off hundreds of workers in what appears a frantic attempt to justify the consolidation and mitigate the company’s $50+ billion in debt. The company has cut content ranging from Snowpiercer, one of the last scripted series on TNT, projects in pre-production or development including JJ Abrams’ Demimonde series at HBO and Kill the Orange-Faced Bear at TBS (cancelled a week before production), and already-filmed features such as Batgirl. The company also pulled dozens of already-released features and series from HBO Max entirely.

The casualties of this mega-merger include numerous projects created by, featuring and/or centering the experiences of women and people of color, including Batgirl, one of very few mainstream superhero films to feature a Latina lead actress; Full Frontal with Samantha Bee, one of a handful of woman-hosted late-night shows; Gordita Chronicles, a series about a Dominican immigrant family whose showrunner was a Latina woman; Tuca & Bertie, an animated series featuring two lead women of color; and Chad, a series about Middle Eastern Americans created by and starring Iranian American comedian Nasim Pedrad. Meanwhile, CEO David Zaslav’s board appointments have uniformly been white men. The Warner Bros. Discovery merger sharply illustrates how consolidation increases the power of gatekeepers at the expense of marginalized voices. As One Day at a Time writer and co-creator Gloria Calderón Kellett put it, “[TV industry consolidation] is erasing Brown stories.”

This ill-advised merger is already a clear disaster for the content creators who have lost jobs and a potential employer, as well as for the consumers who are faced with a poorer, less-diverse content landscape. As Insecure creator Issa Rae put it, consolidation results in “[l]ess risk-taking, fewer decision-makers and fewer options for creators.” Yet Wall Street continues to demand that the media companies combine; media analyst Michael Nathanson argued recently that “[t]his has to become a less competitive industry…they need to consolidate.” The series of mergers that led us here—first the $85 billion AT&T-Time Warner merger and then the $43 billion WarnerMedia Discovery merger—have each promised to create a better competitor, but have instead left the merged entity debt-burdened and focused on cutting costs to rationalize these disastrous business decisions. Yet media’s merger mania shows no sign of slowing; the latest industry speculation is that Comcast may next seek to acquire Warner Bros. Discovery. Absent government intervention, this cycle of reactive consolidation will likely continue until it leaves just three or four companies controlling all content, while content creators and consumers pay the price for these costly mergers.
WRITERS OF CANCELLED PROJECTS SPEAK OUT

“I got into television to counter the negative mainstream stereotypes about Latino communities and tell stories like Gordita Chronicles, which features a young Dominican girl who immigrates with her family to Miami. The showrunner and I did everything in our power to set the show up for success, and the first season was showered with positive reviews and strong viewership numbers. But after the merger, HBO Max was given a new mandate from its Discovery leadership to cut costs and Gordita Chronicles was cancelled just five weeks after first airing, and will now even be removed from the platform. The studio executives claimed the cancellation reflected HBO ‘rebranding’—by implication, away from shows about Latino families. This merger has provided pretty stark and immediate evidence that industry consolidation not only harms diversity and inclusion, but can also contribute to the erasure of U.S. Latinos.”

— Claudia Forestieri, Creator and Executive Producer of Gordita Chronicles

“I originally created Tuca & Bertie for Netflix, but when they cancelled it after just one season, we fought to get the series picked up at Warner’s Adult Swim network. The women-led series had been a cult hit and a critical darling—the Warner execs knew it needed advertising support and time to grow viewers in the male-dominated adult animation space. But the merger went through right before the most recent season launched, and almost everyone who worked on the Tuca & Bertie marketing team was laid off. Then several of the show’s main executives at Adult Swim and HBO Max left in the turmoil. Planned marketing projects to promote the new season didn’t happen. Then we learned the show had been cancelled. It’s already harder for shows centered on women, and this merger cost us the support we needed to thrive.”

— Lisa Hanawalt, Creator and Executive Producer of Tuca & Bertie

“I created a drama that focused on women lawyers and advocates who fought against a culture of sexual harassment and corruption in the U.S. military, achieving historic gains after the murder of Mexican-American soldier Vanessa Guillén at Fort Hood. After a competitive bidding process with multiple outlets, I sold Whistleblower to HBO Max in February 2021. During development, we received only compliments from our executives. The leads were three BIPOC women, and it was a story I was excited to tell. Despite it all, the series was cancelled soon after the merger, before it went into production. The press speculation is that the new company is focusing more on what’s seen as ‘Middle America’ content. But Black, Asian, and Latinx communities are Middle America too.”

— Moisés Zamora, Creator and Executive Producer of Whistleblower

WGAW’s original report “Broken Promises: Media Mega-Mergers and the Case for Antitrust Reform,” is available on wga.org.